Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian Civil War

This weekend, Iran announced a plan for ending the Syrian civil war. The plan, vaguely offering a transition to open elections and a new government, is neither new nor surprising. Iran has been trying to resolve its Syrian problem for months, because if al-Assad falls, Iran will lose its only remaining partner in the Middle East, as well as its supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Like Russia, Iran has a real problem in trying to manage its Syria relationship. Unlike Russia, Iran's problem is more vital to its regional position. Iran, like the Syrian Alawite minority led by al-Assad, is shiite. This pits it and al-Assad against the Saudi sunni faction with its majority position in the region. Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard needs Hezbollah to wage its war of attrition against Saudi Arabia, the sunni Moslems, and Israel. Iran is separated from Saudi Arabia by the Persian Gulf and Iraq. It is separated from Lebanon's Hezbollah by Iraq and Syria. So, an isolated and angry Iran with its link to Hezbollah severed could launch a serious effort to come to terms with the Iraqi leadership in order to preserve its Hezbollah foot soldiers. But the problem here is that Iraq is still easily available to US troops in the region and the Ayatollah would have to roll the dice against US and allied intervention if Iran sought visible hegemony in Iraq. An Iran attack against the joint major US-Saudi military presence in Saudi Arabia is less likely. The other factor weighing on Iran is the increasingly severe sanctions against it that has reduced its petroleum sales by 50%, leading to the reaction of its citizens who blame its government's nuclear enrichment policies for the sanctions and the resulting devaluation of the Iranian currency by 40% this autumn. So, Iran undoubtedly sees its best chance of maintaining its lines with Hezbollah to be Syria, and this means that Iran must now reposition itself to be a major player in Syria, no matter what the outcome of the civil war...including a rebel victory. So, dear readers, look for Iran to become more conciliatory toward the rebels while maintaining its relationship with the Alawites under al-Assad. Do not be surprised if Iran's interests lead it to support the Syrian military, now cautiously putting distance between itself and al-Assad, as the most reasonable pro-Iran survivor of the Syria civil war. Al-Assad is not essential to Iran's regional survival, but the Syrian army may well be.